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The Change from the Creation to the Destruction of
Public Value in Social and Institutional Contexts – A
Case Study of CEO Peer and Policy Networks within the
Dutch Social Housing Sector
Hendrik Marrten Koolma
VU University of Amsterdam
Catharina Frederika van Dreven
Rotterdam School of Management
This study examines the question of which factors can explain the change from creation to
destruction of public value in social and institutional environments. Second, what do CEO peer
networks and policy networks in which CEOs participate contribute to such a change. The aim
of the study is to design and test a comprehensive framework for understanding the change from
value creation to destruction. This framework is constructed through an integration of two dis-
tinct theoretical approaches, public value management and destructive leadership. The second
component is proposed, inasmuch public value management does not take into account the risk
of unethical behavior of organizations’ leaders. The framework is applied to a qualitative analysis
of public management in the Dutch social housing sector. Interviewed CEOs of housing corpora-
tions proudly explained public value creation in the nineties. However, indications of destructive
leadership outnumbered references to value creation in the first decade of this millenium. In this
period, CEOs competed for dominance in peer and policy networks. Reputation drive superseded
improvement drive when determining mergers and hazardous projects, unrelated to social housing
purposes. Instead of authorizing, the institutional environment has been conducive to value
destructing courses of action by CEOs.
Keywords: ethical leadership, public value creation, destructive leadership, reputation, nonprofit
organizations
INTRODUCTION
In a recent article, Heres and Lasthuizen (2012) have found differences in the way exec-
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public or private context. This study intends to deepen the insight into the dependency
between context and leaders’ (un)ethical behavior. Well-doing and wrongdoing are
related to the creation and destruction of public value. By means of an integrated
conceptual framework, an in-depth study is performed in a case of public service
delivery by privately instituted nonprofit organizations. In this situation, both private
and public constituents are present. At the core of this study is a collection of peer
networks with personal and intra-organizational ties to national and local policy net-
works. Service provision is conceived by referring to the public value framework of
Moore (1995). Public value refers to the provision of products and services beneficial
to clients and society; under the condition that the provision has to be appreciated by
clients, stakeholders—including authorities—and the public in general (paraphrasing
Moore, 1995; Moore, 2013; Meynhardt, 2009, p. 212). Although the literature does
not provide a definition of the destruction of public value, it can be derived reversely:
Destruction of public value encompasses a negative change to fewer and inferior prod-
ucts or services, and to less appreciation by clients, stakeholders, and the public
in general.
The main question of this study is: Which factors can explain the change from creation to
the destruction of public value in social and institutional environments, and what do CEO
peer networks and policy networks in which CEOs participate contribute to such a change?
This study aims to design and test a framework for understanding the change from
value creation to destruction. This framework will be constructed through the integration
of two distinct theoretical approaches: public value management and destruc-
tive leadership.
The Dutch public housing sector will be the setting of qualitative research. The sector
amounts to 40% of the houses in the Netherlands. In 1990, a policy change transferred dis-
cretionary power and responsibility from the Dutch state to the boards of private housing cor-
porations. Further, a cultural change was promoted, termed “societal entrepreneurship.”
Boards staffed by volunteers were replaced by non-executive boards of professional supervi-
sors, similarly to two-tier boards of business enterprises. Senior managers obtained the legal
status of the statutory director (henceforth CEO). In the mid-nineties, a conversion of state
loans and subsidization schemes into lump sums caused cash windfalls in the sector, although
they were unequally distributed across the population. Since 1990, a wave of mergers
unrolled, resulting in a decrease in the number of corporations and an increase in corporation
size (see Table 1).
For this study, the relevant period is 2001–2010. The sale of rental houses and restrictions
on the construction of social houses halted the growth of the total housing stock. In this
period, the size of larger (above the population median) corporations increased to 2 times
more than of smaller ones.
Starting in 2008, the media reported on scandals at the top of housing corporations. Cases
of fraud, billion euro losses on sideline projects, and speculative derivatives trading induced
the government to institute a parliamentary inquiry into the behavior of CEOs (2012–2014).
The commission’s public interrogations and reporting disclosed cases of incompetence
and fraud. In reaction to this, all housing corporations were subjected to austere regulation














































2 KOOLMA AND VAN DREVEN
THEORETICAL CONCEPTS AND VARIABLES
In this section, a selection is made of theoretical concepts regarding public value creation
and destruction. Variables are derived from these concepts in the preparation of a coded con-
tent analysis of interviews with CEOs of housing corporations.
In accordance with Moore (2000), it is presumed that public value is applicable in the
management practices of nonprofit organizations. However, public value management has
been a subject of controversy for twenty years after the emergence of Moore’s (1995) sem-
inal book. A synopsis is given by Williams and Shearer (2011). For this study, the focus is
on Rhodes and Wanna’s (2007, p. 417) warning: following Moore, public managers will opt
for transformational leadership and will be limited in their choice of projects and adventurism
only by their own moral compass, interests, and preferences.
In a not very convincing defense, it is has been asserted, that an authorizing environment
will keep public managers from doing wrong (Alford, 2008) by counter-balancing managerial
discretion (Moore & Khagram, 2004). However, it is not ensured whether this will be suffi-
cient considering warnings made by public value authors, For instance, followers might urge
leaders to behave like a god or guru who can create magical solutions (Benington & Moore,
2010, p. 16). In recent work, Moore (2013, Appendix p. 1) opens the possibility that public
managers incur high costs and cause unintended consequences through their projects.
Moore and Khagram (2004) argue that the strategic triangle helps public managers focus
and direct their attention toward three issues: public value outcomes, operational capacities
(both internal and external), and the authorizing environment for acquisition of legitimacy
and support. Public managers should consider these topics before committing themselves and
their organizations to courses of action. The idea is presented as a triangle (see Figure 1).
This explanation indicates a heuristic application of the triangle. The claim that the tri-
angle is also applicable as an empirical model (Alford & O’Flynn, 2009, p. 175) is contested.
In an empirical application, the creation of public value would be the obvious choice for the
dependent variable. In this study, a redesign of the triangle is proposed, in accordance with
Barnard’s basic model of leadership (Barnard, 1949, p. 84). In this model, leaders, followers,
and conditions interact. The revisited model is presented in Figure 2.
With regards to empirical testing, public value literature is not very elaborate. In this
study, leaders’ creativity is proposed as a variable. Further, two sub-variables for creative
leadership are used: entrepreneurship and innovation. For these variables, the count is















































Key figures in the Dutch social housing sector (data from Aedes/Housing Authority)
Key figures 1990 2001 2010 2016
Number of corporations 824 579 401 335
Total rental housing units (RHU) 2,124,300 2,440,460 2,407,758 2,378,206
Mean size (RHU) 2,578 4,215 6,019 7,099
Median size (RHU) n.a. 2,200 2,620 3,824
Increase in mean size above median 46% 17%
Increase in mean size below median 23% 30%
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Operational capabilities are counted when internal or external resources are considered in
relation to public service provision. In the literature, authorizing environment has an open
and non-limitative taxonomy (Moore & Khagram, 2004, p. 6). In the case considered in this
study, the authorizers are the Ministry of Interior Affairs, a national public agency for finan-
cial supervision, a national private guarantee fund for capital market access, and municipal
boards. The count for this variable is increased when those institutional actors are mentioned
in their authorizing role. Sub-categories account for whether the topics of public value cre-
ation receive an approving or disapproving valuation.
Opponents have raised questions about the way public value management addresses the
negative sides of entrepreneurship in a political context. By ignoring the need for managerial
discipline, the proponents would abstract from the dark side processes within public adminis-






























































FIGURE 2 Public value creation triangle revisited.
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for granted and probable conflicting interests are overlooked (Rhodes & Wanna, 2007, p.
412). Conceptually, the abuse of resources for the financial benefit and the name and fame of
managers is excluded. Hence, the public value “model is one-sided.” There is “no conception
of negative public value,” such as “deterioration in service chains” and “expectations that
agencies cannot meet” (all quotes from Rhodes & Wanna, 2007, p. 412). Hood (1991, p. 11)
mentions standards of failure in public management settings: “waste, malversation, and cata-
strophe.” Further, analyses of innovative projects, mergers, and diversifying strategies in pri-
vate contexts provide findings that diverge from the ideal of value creation. Schleifer and
Vishny (1988) term it the “non-value maximizing behavior” of CEOs. Examples are mergers
serving executives’ need for power and wealth but reducing shareholders’ value, failures in
acquisitions not related to the core business (henceforth “unrelated acquisitions”), and com-
mitment to manager-specific innovations and investments, also known as “pet projects”
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). Irrespective of whether one is arguing from the public or private
context, CEOs have the opportunity to detract from value creation and to pursue destructive
courses of action.
As the public value literature deliberately does not account for the occasional bad
behavior of public leaders, another body of literature was deployed. Destruction of value
is a major subject in the literature on toxic or destructive leadership. A generic defin-
ition is:
“The systematic and repeated behavior by a leader, supervisor or manager that violates the
legitimate interest of the organization by undermining and/or sabotaging the organization’s
goals, tasks, resources, and effectiveness and/or the motivation, well-being or job satisfaction of
subordinates” (Einarsen, Schanke, Aasland, & Skogstad, 2007, p. 208).
A model for destructive leadership is proposed by Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser (2007):
Applied to public service provision, the toxic triangle encompasses destruction of public
value. In this study, this triangle and Moore’s (1995) triangle are juxtaposed. Susceptible fol-
lowers (Figure 3) detract from operational capabilities (Figure 2) in the sense that destructive
leaders often favor loyal followers at the expense of their professionally capable fellow-
workers. The application of the two juxtaposed models does not imply a dichotomy in the
change from creation to the destruction of public value, but a simultaneous exercise of con-
verse forces.
From the three topics of their triangle, Padilla et al. (2007) derive variables covered by a
large collection of empirical research. Some variables from this anthology are cited below
and, then, it is briefly explained which categories will be used in this study.
The attributes of destructive leaders are (Padilla et al., 2007, p. 180–182):
 Charisma. The authors clarify “that even when charismatic leaders are not destructive,
they can still be dangerous.” Lack of opposition makes them prone to detrimental deci-
sions. References to charisma, such as “inspiring,” “gifted,” and “visionary,” are counted.
 Personalized need for power. This is the case “when leaders use position power [… ] for
personal gain and self-promotion,” and “use control and coercion to impose their goals
while censuring opposing views.” When one or more of those phenomena are mentioned,
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 Narcissism. It “involves dominance, grandiosity, arrogance, entitlement, and the selfish
pursuit of pleasure.” Only literal (layman’s) references to narcissism are counted.
 Negative life themes. These refer to leaders’ negative experiences. The count on this
variable is only increased when personal histories are explicitly put forward.
 Ideology of hatred. This is at issue when “the rhetoric, vision, and world view of leaders
contain images of hate.” The count on this variable is increased when it is told that feel-
ings of hatred, aversion, and inter-personal feuds guide CEOs’ behavior and deci-
sion-making.
Susceptible followers are divided into two groups: conformers and colluders.
Conformers feel compelled to follow, whereas colluders follow destructive leaders owing to
self-serving considerations. The attributes of susceptible followers are (Padilla et al., 2007,
p. 182–184):
Conformers
 Unmet basic needs. These are assumed to induce conformers to follow destructive lead-
ers. The code is only increased when unfulfilled basic needs are mentioned.
 Negative core self-evaluations. These refer to low “self-esteem” and perception of low
“self-efficacy.” The count for this variable is increased when behavior and actions of fol-
lowers are attributed to low self-evaluations.
 Low maturity. The assumption is that “immature individuals are more likely to conform
to authority.” Not only associations with individuals’ low maturity are counted but also
references to a state of collective immaturity in the CEO population.
Colluders
 Ambition. It is noted that followers strive for status and “may be willing to follow coer-
cive policies if it will advance their personal agendas.” The count for this variable is





















































FIGURE 3 Toxic triangle (Padilla et al., 2007).
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 Similar world view. “When followers link leaders with salient aspects of their own world
view, emotional attachments form.” The count for this category is increased when it is
mentioned that people assemble on shared beliefs and are inspired by stories that reflect
their own world views.
 Unsocialized values. It is assumed that “individuals who endorse unsocialized values
such as greed and selfishness are more likely to follow destructive leaders.” The count
for this is only increased when explicit negative moral judgments are made about attach-
ment to leaders.
The third topic of the triangle encompasses destructive forces from the environment. Here,
too, explanations are provided by Padilla et al. (2007, p. 185–186).
 Instability. “During times of instability, leaders can enhance their power by advocating
radical change.” The count for this category in only increased when it is noted that
instability in the sector paves the way for destructive leaders.
 Perceived threat. “When people feel threatened, they are more willing to accept assertive
leadership.” Only explicit references to threats from the environment are counted.
 Lack of check and balances. “[… ] corporations lacking independent board oversight—
allow individuals [… ] to usurp power.” The count for this category is increased when it
is said that boards fail to guide and bound CEOs’ discretion.
 Failing institutions. Padilla et al. (2007) advocate multiple governance structures. However,
these multiple structures can have gaps in mutual connections, providing opportunities to
destructive leaders to avoid external supervision. In this study, it is proposed that Padilla
et al. (200&) overlook problems of institutionalization. For instance, Elsbach and Sutton
(1992) argue that when supervisors’ reputation concerns prevail, leaders are endorsed for
breakthrough behavior even if they pursue illegitimate courses of action. References to
both kinds of defects are counted in a category for institutional failure.
It is proposed that institutionally promoted competition contributes to a shift from creation
to the destruction of public value. In this study, public value management is conceived as a
specific branch of new public management (see also Stoker, 2006). The entrepreneurial com-
ponents of Hood’s (1991, p. 4–5) taxonomy are clearly recognizable in Moore’s (1995)
account, namely, visible discretionary control by organizations’ leaders, introduction of pri-
vate sector styles of management, and promotion of completion. Moore (2000, p. 200) states
that managers of nonprofit organizations have to compete in a market “in which donors, citi-
zens, and elected representatives make a commitment to public purposes.” Thus, competition
in a public service sector will be personalized and institutionalized. It induces a shift in the
way organizations’ leaders chose goals and interact with one other. Competition between
CEOs is counted when any contest among them is mentioned.
Second, a transfer of strategies, practices, and tools proceeds through a superficially
checked information exchange in quick patterns of action and reaction. Bikhchandani and
Sharma (2000) distinguish between patterns engendered by a search for better investment
opportunities (“informational cascades”) and patterns driven by the need for reputation or














































CHANGE FROM CREATION TO DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC VALUE 7
explicit search for improvement of public service. When ranking, positions, and status of
organizations and their CEOs are mentioned, a score on reputation drive is given.
Transferable strategies and so on are placed into categories as they emerge in the inquiry.
DATA AND METHODS
The research in this study was performed through qualitative methods. Sixteen semi-struc-
tured interviews were conducted using a questionnaire with 4 main questions (see
Appendix). The interviews lasted from 1 to more than 2 hours. The interviewees were very
conversational, reflecting on their own and others’ roles in events. References were made to
the backfiring impact of these events on the credibility of their profession, job satisfaction,
discretionary power, and on organizations’ resources.
All persons approached for this study consented to participate, ensured of anonymity and
untraceability of citations. The interviewees were already known to the interviewers.
Although both have worked in the sector for more than 30 years in a variety of positions, the
researchers possessed only superficial knowledge of persons, relations, and interactions in
the networks.
Based on this limited knowledge, the first selection of 10 persons was made, using criteria
such as prominent membership in opposing networks, gender, spread of work area across the
country, and spread in the start of CEO tenure. A second sample of 6 persons followed. Most
interviewees have previous experience in the sector, for instance, as members of management
teams and as consultants and lobbyists. Some interviewees recently retired but still express
affinity with the sector. The second selection was based on indications and suggestions from
the first stage, using snowball sampling. This method is suited for the discovery of dynamic
social networks (Noy, 2008). At the end of the findings section, an account is given of the
composition of the total sample, attributes of the interviewees, and the influence of those
attributes in the findings. The mixed mode of sampling is not significantly associated with
differences in the findings (see Table 2).
The interviews were memo-recorded and transcribed literally. The transcripts were
coded according to variables derived from theoretical concepts. Relevant themes emerg-
ing during the analysis were placed in additional categories. Text fragments can have
multiple categories, allowing counting intersections of variables. The study presents the
count of text fragments in the interviews as a simple unweighted measure of salience.
When interviewees repeatedly referred to an item, the count on the respective category
were summed.
The text fragments are grouped into four decades:
1. Before 1990, the initial year of policy reform by the Dutch government;
2. From 1990 to 1999, when housing corporations started to innovate;
3. From 2000 to 2009, a period characterized by arbitrary courses of actions by CEOs,
resulting in an institutional crisis;


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHANGE FROM CREATION TO DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC VALUE 9
This study focuses on the transition from period 2 to 3, assuming a change from public
value creation to destruction. Text fragments are summed for these two periods. To illustrate
long-lasting cultural influences, all periods are presented in Table 3.
FINDINGS
Surveying all period (Table 4), the period from 2000 to the crisis has received the
most attention.
The counts of text fragments and their distribution across the topics of the triangles are
presented in Figure 4.
Examining creative leadership in detail (entrepreneurship and innovation), the negative
judgments match positive appraisals in the period from 2000 to the crisis. “Trying, doing—
sure, it was fantastic” and “Important for me was the very creative way of operating” vs.
“We had cowboys and we won prizes, but the reverse was that there was no awareness of
risks” “[… ] when the autonomy grew, CEOs adopted the self-presentation of real estate
men and got personally involved in projects.” Considerations about organizational capacities
were seldom mentioned. “It was all about the iconic things, the reforms, the innovations” and
“There were also advancing corporations that stuck to the social housing purpose.” In
this period, the authorizing environment has received contradictory judgments: 9 fragments
indicate that the authorizing environment was absent while needed. In contrast, 5 fragments
indicate the unwanted presence of an authorizing environment. The period before 2000 shows
some indications of the destruction of public value (29 counted segments), in contrast with
203 counted text segments in the period from 2000 to the crisis.
The interviewees paid much attention to aspects associated with the destruction of public















































Attention paid to periods
Before 1990 1990–1999 2000-crisis Future
Number of interviewees 9 15 16 7
Text segments 28 73 306 8
TABLE 4
Detailed attributes of destructive leaders
Attribute 1990–1999 2000-crisis
Charisma 0 6
Personalized power 4 15
Narcissism 1 3
Negative life themes 0 0
Ideology of hatred 13 7
Moral superiority 0 9
10 KOOLMA AND VAN DREVEN
“[… ] was inspiring,” “They had guts and vision,” “Their charisma forced awe, respect,
and fear.” Personalized power is reflected in the following responses to critical questions
from peers: “That is the way great entrepreneurs do it, and I am one of them” and “Do














































3 9 3 7












































FIGURE 4 Number of text fragments related to creation and destruction of public value.
TABLE 5
Detailed attributes of susceptible followers
Attribute 1990–1999 2000-crisis
Conformers
Unmet needs 0 0
Low core self-evaluation 0 1
Low maturity 1 2
Enforced following 1 12
Colluders
Ambition 0 18
Similar world view 0 5
Bad values 0 5
CHANGE FROM CREATION TO DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC VALUE 11
breakthrough events that gave a freeway to narcissists.” Interviewees indicate hatred of
CEOs toward the former sector organization NWR in the first period. Interpersonal animosity
between leaders of the networks was mentioned in the second period. Moral superiority is an
additional category that emerged from the interviews. Some quotes read: “Messianic behav-
ior,” “They were so convinced of their own goodness, monomaniacally driven by the thought
of doing what is right and just, that they became stone-blind to the other side.” Some further
quotes were: “Paternalistic in their claim of knowing what is good for society.” In “fiascos
[… ] reality was subordinated to their belief to be right and just.”
Subsequently, details on the topic of susceptible followers are presented (Table 6).
Notably, enforced following and ambition exhibit high counts in the second period.
Enforced following emerged as a category from the interviews. Pressure from leaders, peer
networks, and policy networks have coerced CEOs to reluctant following: “You had to be
very firm to resist all the pressure put on you.” “Why don’t you just do it like [… ]?” Quotes
about maturity in the sector included: “They acted like unruly adolescents.” Ambition is
found in citations like: “You wanted to join in and feel that you count,” “You wanted to
belong to the leading group,” and “We all applauded for them, even ministers and municipal
boards did.” Similarity of world view is proposed as a condition for being accepted by spe-
cific networks. An example of bad values reads: “Shameless [… ] and in awareness of the
damage caused by” two former CEOs, a politician “still wants to have them back.”
Third, the conducive environment receives a closer observation (Table 7).
The count on lack of checks and balance refers to non-executive boards (internal supervi-
sors) being submissive to their CEOs and depending on reputation gains from the CEOs’
strategic moves. “They did nothing. Board members who are impressed by their CEO—those
are the worst ones.” Failing institutions are related to ministers and high officials presenting















































Detailed attributes of conducive environment
Attribute 1990–1999 2000-crisis
Instability 0 1
Perceived threat 0 2
Lack of checks and balances 1 22
Failing institutions 3 45
Real estate trading 1 5
Cash windfalls 2 20
TABLE 7
Counts of cultural attributes in the sector across different periods
Attribute Before 1990 1990–1999 2000-crisis Crisis-present
Self-assertiveness 16 19 31 2
Competition within
peer network
0 0 9 0
Rivalry in policy networks 0 8 22 1
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institutional actors “encouraged quasi-entrepreneurs” to take risks, while “boosting and ena-
bling everything they wanted to do.” Entrepreneurial CEOs were highly praised by ministers,
top officials, municipal boards, and other institutional actors. “You were put on a pedestal
when you decided to be involved in projects unrelated to social housing,” although those
were perceived as “very risky.” Incidents of collusion are indicated, such as: “A minister
consented in an invitation of [… ] to switch jobs for one day,” “a CEO was hired via his
own consultancy firm by the department,” “[… ] had a lot of friends in the department,” and
“[… ] himself arranged to be invited to meetings with the minister.” Further, it is mentioned
that both internal and national (external) supervisors have been unresponsive to several noti-
fications of fraud and unsound policies. Two categories were added: (1) real estate trading,
which is associated with opportunities for committing fraud and (2) cash windfalls (due to
lump sum subsidization and the permission to sell rental houses), associated with a lack of
decision-making discipline and the willingness to accept large pre-calculated losses in com-
mercial projects.
Although the rule of the former sector organization NWR vanished, a cultural legacy
persisted. The most salient effect according to the interviewees was the growth of CEOs’
self-assertiveness, conceived as an urge “to be one’s own boss,” “adversity to interference,”
and being “overly self-righteous.” Table 3 presents references to self-assertiveness.
In the period from 2000 to the crisis, the self-assertiveness was amplified by representa-
tives of the government and the new sector organization, Aedes, with public calls for
“showing guts” and “ideological promotion of self-regulation.” In the same period, a portion
of interviewees experienced competition. The parlance of the interviewees contained “ape
rock rivalry” (n¼ 8), “pissing games” (n¼ 8), and “masculine culture” (n¼ 13). An example
of the latter was: “In the beginning there were almost no women on the job. Conferences
were concluded with a bus service to brothels.” Comments about the period from 2000 to the
crisis included: “It was male games” “A culture of big man emerged,” “It was all about
power, power, and power,” “They were boasting and bragging about having bigger organiza-
tions, more daring projects, etc.,” and, even: “My worries are more serious than yours.”
From 2000 to the crisis, ministers and high officials induced an increase in competitive
dynamics by “granting the government access to prominent CEOs individually,” “deliberately
bypassing the channels of the sector organization.” “Being in the lobby made you important.”
Networks were “started in order to contest Aedes.” “It was a fight about who was the boss of
the sector. [… ] won, that’s how it was seen by most people.”
As mentioned above, there are two kinds of drives for the transfer of strategies, practices,
and organizational tools (Table 8).
In the period from 2000 to the crisis, the reputation drive is mentioned more frequently
than the improvement drive. “Talk was about becoming big, bigger, and biggest.” Rankings
and position relative to others were said to be more important than learning: “[… ] consid-
ered [… ] as the best, so learning from others was impossible.” Table 9 presents how
transferable strategies, practices, and tools are categorized into the improvement and
reputation drives, based on the interviewees’ explanatory remarks.
In the interviews, reputation-driven activities like mergers, real estate projects, land acqui-
sition, and sideline activities were associated with high risk-taking, unrelated acquisitions,
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bade 10 million euro more to the municipality.” In real estate projects: “[… ] overbid on
locations and acquired the projects in our own city. [… ] We could not account for that kind
of bidding and we lost tenders time after time.” In land acquisition: “it was ordinary little
country nonsense,” “employees of [… ] were bribing in order to get a position in our
region.” In sideline activities: “in hindsight, we discovered that figures were much worse
than we were told at every turn of the project.”
The interviewees were not conclusive about the net effects of creative and destructive
forces on public value in the period 2000-crisis. The provision of social housing continued
during this period, although it was not an important subject within CEO networks. Some
interviewees suggested that CEOs who showed concern for clients and the operational proc-
esses were “ridiculed.” The drift of CEOs to being “big, bigger, and biggest in the race to
becoming more important” created large organizations with, eventually, “unrelated working
areas”: “Claimed efficiency gains were neither tested nor attained.” The race in peer net-
works toward more and more power by “boasting and trumping one another also included
the amounts of pre-calculated losses in investments and the degree of unrelatedness of
innovative sideline projects” (e.g. ships, hotels, industrial buildings, power plants, and deriva-
tive trading). Larger corporations did not participate in public experimentation programs any-
more. They became “too important to fail” and committed themselves to “endeavoring
projects” “without an exit-option.” Their colleagues “admired their courage and impact” and
were “inspired by their stories and views.” Even in hindsight, the majority of the interview-
ees expressed feelings of admiration and affection and stated that “CEOs’ intentions were
















































Type of drive in the transfer of strategies, practices, and tools




Transferable strategies, practices, and tools categorized by drive type
Transferable strategies, practices, and tools Improvement-driven Reputation-driven
Mergers and acquisitions 7 19
Review system 10 4
Real estate projects 1 12
Derivatives 7 4
Land acquisition 3 9
Decision-making 9 0
Publicity 3 6
Sideline activities 1 5
Benchmarking 2 2
Significance in Chi-square tests: p< 0.1, p< 0.05, p< 0.01.
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At the end 2008, the sector crisis started with the scandal reporting by the media and
“showy moral judgments during parliamentary debates.” Interviewees were resentful of “the
turn made by politics.” The housing corporations lost the support of the public in general.
“The scandals facilitated a foreseeable withdrawal of resources” through specific taxation by
the Dutch state.
Finally, a question is raised regarding the extent to which the selection of interviewees
might have influenced the findings on creation and destruction of public value. The inter-
viewees were categorized based on 7 contrasting attributes. The grouped counts of text frag-
ments were compared through goodness of fit tests. The results of the tests are presented
in Table 2.
The gender of the 16 interviewees affected the findings. In the study, women (n¼ 3)
paid slightly more attention to the destructive aspects. The difference found in aspects
of destructive leaders is highly significant. In their interviews, women mentioned exam-
ples of intimidation by male colleagues, and the threat of hostile takeovers. Those expe-
riences might be incidental. Further, newcomers (n¼ 8) paid significantly more attention
to the aspects of susceptible followers, perhaps due to their novice positions in peer net-
works. CEOs with long tenures paid significantly more attention to the conducive
aspects of the institutional environment. Remarkably, the size of organization did not
make a difference. CEOs working in the major urban area, “Randstad,” (n¼ 8) men-
tioned the aspects of destructive leadership more frequently. A plausible explanation
might be a proximity effect: they have been close colleagues of those involved in the
most salient cases of failure and fraud. Nine interviewees with direct access to national
politics paid significantly less attention to the creation than to the destruction of public
value. Three interviewees who appeared to be prominent members of peer networks
exhibited a slightly significant difference with regard to aspects of destructive leaders.
Five interviewees explicitly showed affiliation to a notion of societal entrepreneurship,
explained as an attitude to overpass the limits of conventional task fulfillment and a
willingness to place organizational resources at the disposal of societal demands. This
group paid more attention to the creation of public value and less attention to the
aspects of destructive leaders. This particular difference is highly significant. Finally, it
is noted that the topics susceptible followers and conducive environment are rather
insensitive to grouping into sub-samples, suggesting a considerable degree of consensus
on these topics.
CONCLUSION
The research question of this study is:
“Which factors can explain the change from creation to destruction of public value in social
and institutional environments and what do peer networks and policy networks in which CEO
participate contribute to such a change?”
The context for this inquiry was the Dutch public housing sector. Sixteen CEOs of
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light on the research question. The following factors can explain a sector’s change of course
change to less public value creation:
 Path-dependent factors, which, in this case, were a culture of self-assertiveness and hat-
red traced back to a former sector organization. Further, emerging cash windfalls and the
fraud susceptibility of real estate trading came to light as such factors.
 A reform of state policy entailing a promotion of personalized entrepreneurship and com-
petition between leaders of public service delivering organizations.
 The emergence of competition in which reputation gain is pursued at the expense of
organizations’ actual and future resources, resulting into an action and reaction pattern
towards bigger organizations, increasing losses, and acquisitions with a decreasing degree
of relatedness to public service purpose.
 A social and institutional construction of entrepreneurship within peer and policy net-
works, which enhances the tendency to take risks without proper assessment by the
organizations and to lack of decision-making and other managerial skills, resulting in
large business failures.
 A shift from an authorizing environment to a conducive environment, where boards,
national agencies, government representatives, and other institutional actors stop guiding
and bounding the discretionary power of the organizations’ leaders. These actors switch
to a networked governance style of enabling and boosting leaders’ great but unsound
actions in pursuit of inflating their own reputation and short-term policy successes.
DISCUSSION
The use of public value creation and destruction concepts from different bodies of literature
helps to comprehend the influence of social and institutional contexts on the (un)ethical
behavior of leaders of nonprofit organizations. This study presents a close-up of power
dynamics, ill-governed risk-taking, loss of purpose, and pursuit of self-interest, all happening
in an entrepreneurial and innovating public service sector. In that respect, support is found
for Rhodes and Wanna’s (2007) warnings.
Attention has to be paid to particularities of the context. In this study, emerging cash
windfall have allegedly contributed to unsound decision-making by public managers. In pri-
vate business research, it is found that cash windfalls induce CEOs and their boards to merg-
ers which destroy firm value (von Berschwitz, 2018). Nohria and Gulati (1996) point out that
an excess of resources leads to relinquishment of financial discipline at innovative projects.
Those circumstances seem to affect public managers’ decisions likewise.
In this article, Public Value Management (PVM) is considered to be a variant of New
Public Management, a variant in which entrepreneurial themes are embraced, while disci-
plary approaches are detested. The cultural context shapes the way in which NPM, and con-
sequently PVM, are interpreted and applied (Pillay, 2008; Stoker, 2006). Therefore, it is
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In thus research, strong indications are found for a noxious impact of the institutional
environment on the behavior of public managers. By promoting and enabling unsound proj-
ects the political principals of the public agents have themselves been a source of moral haz-
ard (Eswaran & Kotwal, 1984). In search of policy success, illegitimate and even illegal
actions by public managers have been tolerated., just like Elsbach and Sutton (1992)
have found.
Further, the PVM strategy of promoting a personalized and heroic version of public
entrepreneurship has likely fostered personalities with a high need for personal power
and destructive propensities such as self-promotion, waste of resources, and disengage-
ment with consequences for others (Padilla et al., 2007). By being supportive and even
submissive to those CEOs, internal and external supervisors also have shown destructive
leadership, when the the definition prevously cited (Einarsen et al., 2007) is taken
into account.
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APPENDIX: QUESTIONNAIRE INTERVIEWS OF HOUSING
CORPORATIONS CEOS
At the start of the conversation, the interviewees are asked to talk about their entry in the
community and about the networks in which they have participated.
1. How has the community of practice operated in the period from 1990 to approxi-
mately 2010? Has the community changed since that time, and if so, in what way?
2. What ideas, strategies, and practices have been adopted among CEOs and are they
employed in their organizations?
3. How are the objects of transfer judged in the light of the values shared by the CEOs?
How is the distinction made between right and wrong?
4. How are opinions made concerning the performance and status of individual CEOs
within the community and the surrounding field?
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